

REVIEW ARTICLE

Immigrants' Labor Market Performance: with a Focus on Immigrant Women

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Abstract

This paper critically reviews predominant works on the issue of labor market performance of women, focusing particularly on the case of immigrant women in Canada, while also comparing with the case of immigrants in America. It provides a brief conceptual explanation of immigration and its impact on the host economy. It observes the eminent theories on labor market performance and factors influencing labor activity of immigrants. Due to the expansive nature of this topic and the wide range of labor market performance indicators, it focuses on the following indicators: wages, and earnings. Thus, welfare topics, such as welfare participation, contribution and expenditures, incidence of unemployment, and that of poverty are not elaborated in these subsections. Finally it presents the prominent themes in ongoing research concerning the determinants of labor market performance of immigrant women, in particular the price explanation, the family investment hypothesis, the bargaining model and the cultural effect model, while simultaneously providing critiques of the same.

Keywords: *Bargaining model, Family investment hypothesis, Immigrant, Women, Labor.*

Introduction

Some analogize immigration to “a tide, which may ebb when it has swept away the pines”, while others may liken it to an inundation¹. Regardless of what perspectives are adopted by researchers or are implicit in immigration policies, immigration and immigrant-related topics appear to have, particularly in the context of “traditional” host countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia, gained prominence in the political and economic arenas. According to a 1989 United Nations estimate, 60 million people, i.e. 1.2 percent of the global population, reside in a nation that is not their country of birth. These numbers justify the recent surge in research with regards to the economic performance of immigrant populations in host countries, whereupon this essay highlights the theories and findings surrounding this topic. However, our interest, and therefore the contention of this paper, is also to delve into the more specific issue of the labor market performance of immigrant women, and to delineate factors that may influence a divergence in the labor market behavior of immigrant women from that of their counterparts, immigrant men, native women, and native men.


Immigration and Impact on Host Economy

Disregarding political agendas associated with immigration laws, the foremost foci of

immigration policy can be attributed to self-interest, i.e. the maximization of “national welfare”, which encompasses the “welfare of the existing stock of [the host nation's] residents” and that of “potential immigrants” and to altruism, i.e. humanitarian concerns. Thus, the actions adopted by policymakers are governed by their slant on the labor market impact of immigration. In their book, *Labour Market Economics*, Benjamin Gunderson and Riddell [1] outline the principal theoretical issues surrounding the effect of immigration on the labor market using a supply and demand model. Panel (a) of the diagram is reflective of the adverse effects that may transpire due to immigration; wages get unambiguously regressed as the number of potential workers increases due to immigration. In addition, if wages do not “fully adjust to clear the market, unemployment might also ensue”. Nevertheless, concurrent to the above shift in supply, panel (b) shows that immigrants may contribute towards an increased labor demand in the economy, via purchase of domestic goods and services and by affecting the trade patterns of the host nation.

Labor Market Performance of Immigrants

Besides the adverse impact immigration has on the economy, the economic performance of



immigrants is of policy interest for it can be viewed as a “measure of the immigrant contribution to the economy's skill endowment and productivity” [2]. Subsequently, as today's potential immigrant is tomorrow's resident, whereby the national welfare of the host country is composite of the immigrants' welfare, the degree of economic assimilation, with regards to hours worked, wages and earnings, of immigrants into the labor market needs to be identified. Benjamin, Gunderson, and Riddell postulate the following about the economic integration of immigrants: “Upon their arrival, immigrants may face a period of unemployment while searching for a job, thus they start out at a lower level of hours worked than similar native-born individuals, but upon spending time in the host country, the immigrants catch up to the native-born with regards to hours of labor supplied. Also, upon arrival, immigrants may lack some of the less observable skills that the native-born individuals possess, for instance: language, knowledge of the local labor market, more specific (but unobservable) skills particular to the regional firms; immigrant labor market performance is further inflicted by the inadequate recognition of their educational credentials. These factors together may initially cause a wage differential between immigrant and native-born individuals (thus causing a negative entry effect); with time however, one could expect their wages to converge (i.e. an assimilation effect)”ⁱⁱ [1]. The following two subsections portray the immigrants' overall labor market performance in both Canada and the United States. The results obtained by Jean Paul Prefontaine and Andrew Benson, based on Canadian data, and those by George Borjas, who uses American data, are summarized, thereby providing two case studies to test Benjamin, Gunderson and Riddell's aforementioned hypotheses.

Canada

Prefontaine and Benson [3] profile the Canadian foreign-born population and examine their relative labor market success by comparing performance indicators such as average income,

receipt of transfer payments, and incidence of poverty by immigration status and period of arrival. They use three data sources, the Landed Immigrant Data System (LIDS), the Longitudinal Immigration Data Base (IMDB), and the Census (maintained by Statistics Canada). Their article indicates that their perception of the general pattern of immigrants' labor market integration is coherent with that of Benjamin, Gunderson and Riddell. Thus, they verify these hypotheses by estimating the following three effects on immigrant earnings:

- The (negative) entry effect – they isolate the penalty in initial employment earnings suffered by immigrants upon arrival
- The assimilation effect
- The cohort effect—they observe the earnings differentials across successive arrival cohorts

The article fails to elaborate on the findings regarding the “assimilation effect”; nonetheless, it does analyze the “entry effect” and the “cohort effect” and attempts a variety of explanations for the results obtained. Comparing the employment earnings peaks and troughs suggests that recent new arrivals may be experiencing greater difficulties during periods of higher unemployment [3]. However, one must be wary, since “*average* employment earnings among new immigrants” (across cohorts) is too vast a categorization of earnings profile and only responses to overall changes in economic indicators may be reflected in such a profile.

The results obtained also suggest an increasing wage differential (across cohorts) between new arrivals and native-born individuals. Therewith, they explore the possible explanatory factors (suggested by other researchers), to which they had made reference at the onset of the paper; however, they do not endeavor to conduct a regression analysis to test the impact of these factors on the increase in wage differential across cohorts. In order to understand the incompleteness of their analysis, consider the following proceedings that they undertake. First, they state the statistics on the changing distribution of immigrant landings by source region due to the change in policy between the late 1960's and mid 1980's. There was a significant shift towards admissions for the purpose of family reunification, and for humanitarian reasons; ... the proportion of immigrants admitted under refugee and family status increased from 26 percent in 1968 to as high as 70 per cent in 1983 [3].ⁱⁱⁱ

Then later, they show average employment

earnings by source region and landing year for the year 1995.^{iv} Though these findings are interesting, it would be of greater interest to tie these in with the analysis on wage differentials. Now suppose, if one were to look at the percentage of immigrants aged 20 and over landing with foreign credentials, 1980 to 1998, then the results obtained suggest that the percent of immigrants with any postsecondary degree fell slightly in the mid 80's, however, the percentages were steadily higher, from the mid 80's onwards, than they were in the early 80's. If earnings were considered to exhibit positive returns to education, then one would expect the earnings profile of successive immigrant cohorts to exhibit a general upward trend. However, this is not the case. In addition, within the time frame observed in this paper, the percent of "non-assessed" immigrants has risen, simultaneous to the increase in educational levels across arrival cohorts. An interesting consideration would be to test what these observations may suggest about the characteristics (especially educational attainment) of the successive cohorts of "non-assessed" immigrants. In order to isolate the forces governing the increasing gap in wages/earnings between immigrants and native-born, and the degree and direction of influence of these factors, the findings of this paper need to be built upon by modifying the regression analysis to incorporate these factors into one model.

United States

George Borjas [2] also verifies the hypotheses made by Benjamin, Gunderson and Riddell, using Cheswick [4] econometric methodology based on American data. He analyzes the adaptation of immigrant skills to American labor market by estimating the following cross-section regression model:

$$\log w_i = X_i\Phi + \delta A_i + \gamma_0 I_i + \gamma_1 y_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where w_i is worker i 's wage rate; X_i is a vector of socioeconomic characters (education, region of residence, etc.); A_i gives the worker's age or potential labor market experience; I_i is a dummy variable indicating if the worker is an immigrant; y_i and gives the number of years an immigrant worker has lived in the United States.

Cheswick's [4] analysis of the 1970 Census produces the following results: immigrants earn 17 percent less than natives, at the time of arrival, but within 15 years after arrival, immigrant earnings "overtake" native earnings. "After 30 years, in the United States, the typical

immigrant earns about 11 percent more than a comparable native worker." [2].

Cheswick explained these results with two arguments; the first being that initial immigrant labor market performance is weaker than that of native-born individuals because of the lack of U.S. specific skills amongst new arrivals; this finding supports the entry effect hypothesis and is also coherent with the findings of Prefontaine and Benson who used Canadian data. The graph also suggests the existence of an "assimilation effect", which Borjas explains using a selection argument, for a human capital hypothesis does not sufficiently explain why the immigrant earnings overtake those of natives.

However, the self-selection analysis of immigration only presents the supply side of immigration; and, as Borjas points out, there has yet to be a well-defined theory on the particulars of the demand-side influences that enable us to comprehend the emergence of any "immigration equilibrium".

Borjas also makes some important observations on the shortcomings of the "cohort effect" in the form it is typically modeled. He points out how cross-section regression may paint a fallacious picture about the adaptation and integration of successive arrival cohorts "if there are intrinsic differences in productivity across immigrant cohorts" [2].

Labor Market Performance of Immigrant Women

There is a great diversity in immigration policies across countries. Some countries, such as the United States, award entry visas mainly to applicants who have relatives already residing in the country. Other countries, such as Australia and Canada, award visas to persons who have a desirable set of socio-economic characteristics, and still other countries, such as Germany, encouraged the migration of "temporary" guest workers in the 1960s ... [2].

Nevertheless, it can safely be said that the general drift of immigration policy in all these host countries has been towards an increased percent representation of family class applicants in the host country's immigrant population. Canadian immigration policy, for instance, has shifted its emphasis from skill-based to family-reunification, which has had two implications: firstly, the latter suggests an increase in the pool of economically non-assessed immigrants; secondly it has resulted in an increase in

immigrant, married women entering Canada [5]. Thus, research on the labor market performance of immigrant women has recently proliferated.

Factors Influencing Labor Market Performance of Immigrant Women

The three characteristic phenomena of the labor market integration of immigrants' entry effect, cohort effect and assimilation effect may have disparate impacts on the labor market performance of immigrant women versus that of immigrant men. The labor market analysis of Canadian immigrants indicates that earnings of male immigrants assimilate quicker than female immigrants [6-7] and while immigrant women's labor market participation is high, relative to that of native-born women, this difference declines with the number of years spent in Canada (Baker and Benjamin). Baker and Benjamin [8] provide two explanations for these observations, the price (or labor supply) explanation and "family investment model".

Price Explanation

The price explanation suggests that differences in relative wages and asset incomes of wives and husbands accounts for the entry effect on immigrant women's labor supply. If the wife's and husband's nonmarket times are gross substitutes, wage assimilation could lead to a decline in the ratio of their hours and thus could account for the divergence in their rates of earnings assimilation. Benjamin and Baker [8] test the price hypothesis of labor supply using a pooled sample of "census family" heads and spouses from the 1986 and 1991 Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances. They estimate hours' equations by^v:

$$h_{it}^j = Z_{it}^j \Phi^j + \varepsilon_{it}^j$$

where

i: family

j: husband or wife

h_{it}^j : annual hours of husband or wife

Z_{it}^j : vector of control variables and measures of immigrant assimilation^{vi}

Their regression results for immigrant women's hours of work indicate a positive cohort effect (given husbands and wives are from the same cohort, i.e. who immigrated in the same period)^{vii}, and a negative assimilation effect^{viii}. As for males, the findings indicate that their labor supply increases in both their own and wife's years since migration, and both own and wife's cohort effects are negative, implying that immigrant men have lower initial labor supply relative to that of native-born individuals. The wage regression results suggest a similar pattern, for immigrants

of both sexes, wages are initially lower than those of natives, but they eventually match and overtake those of natives with years since migration. Implicit in the price explanation is that the cohort and years since migration effects (that appear in the hours equations) capture the effects of wages (which are omitted in these equations) on labor supply. In order to test this hypothesis Baker and Benjamin expand the above model to incorporate a life-cycle consideration. Testing this hypothesis, they find that: [The] cohort effects pick up immigrant-native differences in ct_{it} and kit , [where alt is a vector of taste characteristics, and kit is the log of the current marginal utility of wealth^{ix}]. If there are no systematic or peculiar forms of uncertainty, however, and no changes in preferences with assimilation, the YSM terms remain a potential source of identification of the intertemporal wage effects as long as the labor supply model itself is valid [8]. Baker and Benjamin reject the price hypothesis because the own and cross wage elasticity's of immigrant men and women are not "nearly large enough to reconcile the empirical assimilation profiles in their wages and employment. [Also], the assimilation in employment experienced by immigrants in different families does not have a common wage source." [8] Thus, the price explanation of differential assimilations of immigrant men and women does not sufficiently explain the results found by Benjamin and Baker.

Family Investment Hypothesis

The family investment hypothesis is based on the theory that immigrant families face credit constraint upon arrival and in order to avoid the implications of such a constraint on current consumption, immigrant husbands and wives separate the borrowing and investment activities; i.e. one partner takes a low investment job in order to help finance the investment of the other.

Thus, the predictions of this model are as follows:

- Individuals performing the borrowing role would supply, relatively, more hours early in the life-cycle
- They will have flatter wage profiles as they are employed in low-investment occupations
- Relative to individuals with no credit constraint, these individuals would face a higher propensity to drop out of the labor force [8].

These predictions are supported by the econometric results obtained from the lifecycle analysis of female hours and wage equations. Females in immigrant families exhibit initial annual hours in excess of the base employment in native families; whereas, those in mixed families

exhibit lower levels relative to native families. These results are coherent with the predictions of the family investment hypothesis. However, this model does not sufficiently explain the results observed for immigrant males, for they have lower initial hours than native males in both family categories (immigrant and mixed). With regards to the wage profiles, immigrant women in mixed families have a steeper wage profile than those in immigrant families. Immigrant men in mixed families, however, do not appear to encounter wage assimilation; in fact, their wage profiles seem similar to that of native men. The contribution of the Family Investment Hypothesis is critical to the analysis of labor market performance of immigrant women. For instance, in the case of partners with identical characteristics (i.e. similar levels of human capital accumulation etc.), there is no “a priori presumption” of which family member performs the borrowing function. Therefore, if the female assumes the role of the borrower, that would reflect the “labor market discrimination females encounter, or any comparative advantage they possess in nonmarket activities” [8]. However, though they explicitly made this point, Benjamin and Baker do not explore this scenario using the data.

Bargaining Model

The shortcomings of the family investment model arise from their assumption of a “family-common” utility function, which thereby implicitly overlooks the existence of individual utility functions of the married couple. Biswal [5] argues that “the gains of marriage are shared through other externalities maintaining the differences in preferences of each member” [5]. Thus, in this model, the labor supply decision is sensitive to who controls the non-labor income, as it observes both the marriage and labor supply decisions simultaneously. The indirect utility functions, (obtained from their respective utility functions and budget constraints) for the males and females (outside the marriage) are given below:

$$V^w(w_w, y_w; \alpha_w),$$

$$V^h(w_h, y_h; \alpha_h).$$

These functions serve as the respective "threat points" that the male and female partners may utilize in a marriage scenario. The utility after marriage is given by the following:

$$U_0^w = U_0^w(X, T - h_w, T - h_h; \alpha_w, \alpha_h)$$

$$U_0^h = U_0^h(X, T - h_w, T - h_h; \alpha_w, \alpha_h)$$

Thus, in a two-person marriage, a cooperative game results from the following maximization

problem, thereby producing Nash Equilibrium.

$$\max_{\{X, h_w, h_h\}} \ln(U_0^w - V^w) + \ln(U_0^h - V^h)$$

$$s. t. : X = w_w h_w + w_h h_h + y_w + y_h$$

Note: In the equations above,

T: time constraint

h_w, h_h : labor supply function of wife and husband, respectively

X: amount of composite goods consumed by the household

w_w, w_h : wage rate of the wife and husband, respectively

y : family non-labor income

α_w, α_h : are the extra-household environment parameters – these will shift the maximum value of utility attainable by the individual (wife, husband) outside marriage. This model expands on the “Family Investment Hypothesis”, in that the labor supply decision of a wife is dependent not only on her own wages and those of her spouse, but also on non-labor income such that hers is differentiated from his^x. Biswal also breaks up the nonlabor income into capital income accrued and transfer (government transfer) income received by either (or both) of the partners.

She tests the following hypotheses:

- Whether capital income accrued is significantly different from the transfer income received (tested separately for wives and for husbands),
- Whether each of these is significantly different from that of the partners'.

The results of her analysis suggest that married women have a differential response to (own) nonlabor income depending on the source; labor supply increases with own investment income and decreases with transfer income. As for the nonlabor income of the husband, it has a negative impact on labor supply regardless of source. She also finds that “control over the transfer income is important and has implications for the labor supply behavior of married women” [5]. Biswal uses these findings to support her argument that income-pooling is not statistically supported.

Family Investment Hypothesis versus Bargaining Model

Though the bargaining model presents a thorough argument that depending on the source of nonlabor income, and on who 'owns' it, the labor supply of married women is affected differently, the methodology adopted in this article leads one to doubt whether these findings can be used to discredit the investment-pooling hypothesis. The reason being, the family investment model, as examined by Benjamin and Baker [8], observes

the *life-cycle* patterns resulting in labor supply and wages due to *credit-constraint*, which according to Benjamin and Baker, is experienced by immigrant families^{xi}, whereas Biswal [5] looks at snapshots of 1986 and 1992 to draw upon her conclusions, and does not differentiate between the family types. Thus, though it may be that at a given time women have differential responses as suggested by Biswal, when they take life-time labor market activity into consideration, the family investment hypothesis is more relevant, especially in the case of immigrant families where both partners are immigrants (belonging to the same cohort, for simplicity). It appears that Biswal acknowledges this for she includes the following statement in her paper: "A common finding among the existing studies is that the common preference model of family seems to be appropriate when preschool children are present in the household and the bargaining model is more appropriate in the absence of young children... It is argued that young children, rather than leisure, appear to be the important jointly consumed commodity for husband and wife"[5]. Furthermore, life-cycle consideration of "married" women may affect the utility functions taken into consideration. The utility functions Biswal uses are given in the form: $V(w, y; \alpha)$, which can be rewritten as $V(P(w,y), \alpha)$. However, I believe that α , which is "extra household environment parameters", EEP's, may also affect $P(.)$ not just $V(.)$. If this is the true specification of the individual's indirect utility, then the Bargaining model may underestimate the joint utility and overstate the individual's threat point. At this point, then, it is important to know what variables are used to define these EEP's, which are not explicitly stated in Biswal's paper.

Cultural Factors Explanation

"Cultural factors" may contribute to the analysis of labor market performance of immigrant women who are affiliated with different cultural backgrounds as "cultural differences may give rise to systematic differences in behavior by women in different ethnic or nativity groups who face the same constraints or opportunity set" this direction of analysis is undertaken by Reimers and Antecol [9-10], who endeavor to observe the impact of cultural factors on immigrant women's labor supply and wages respectively.

Reimers' [9] paper attempts to explain cultural factors, using dummy variables for ethnic origin along with other general characteristics to obtain the hours equation for female labor participation. However, her paper, published in 1985, does not present the in depth "cultural factor" analysis I am looking for. Antecol's paper uses Census data

for 1990 (United States Census, five percent Public Use Microdata sample), and conducts the analysis for 21 ethnic groups. She collects data on the source countries (of the immigrants belonging to these 21 ethnic groups) with respect to the gender wage gap, and uses this information to stipulate her argument that "portable" cultural factors, gender wage gap in source country, influence the wage differential experienced by immigrant women in the United States [10].

She points out that there exists considerable variation in the gender wage gap among the various ethnic groups in the States and that "these differences are not confined to variation between 'traditional' and newer source countries" [10]. Nevertheless, she finds that, overall there is assimilation towards the United States mean gap of 32.9%. Furthermore, she finds that assimilation occurs, for the most part, about one generation after leaving home. Like Benjamin and Baker did using Canadian data, Antecol also finds a positive cohort effect.

In her regression methods, Antecol [10] formulates an unadjusted gender wage gap equation to verify wage differences across ethnic groups. She looks at two other model specifications, the first adding "controls for only exogenous personal characteristics", she terms this model X-adjusted gap, and the second adding "controls for both exogenous and potentially endogenous personal characteristics"[10], termed the XZ-adjusted gap. She finds that the magnitude of the ethnic origin coefficient remains stable across these three specifications. Even after controlling for both exogenous and potentially endogenous personal characteristics, there remain substantial differences across ethnic origin groups [10]. This leads into her estimation of the "portable cultural factors" as a possible explanation for the results mentioned above. She thus estimates equations, where the regression coefficients of X-adjusted and XZ-adjusted wage gaps are specified as functions of the source country's wage gap, using GLS estimation, and finds that there is a positive and significant relation between the wage gap for a given ethnic group and that of its source country.

She conducts a robustness check for she acknowledges that the above model may contain a selectivity bias in that only the 'able' women from the specified ethnic groups participate and therefore only their wage profiles are observed. She checks for sample selection bias by re-estimating the GLS equations with an additional regressor that controls for the fraction of women who worked across ethnic groups [10]. She finds

the sample selection correlation coefficient to be insignificant, and thus the robustness of her model is maintained.

Though the results appear robust, the 21 source countries (ethnic groups), that she arguably uses due to data availability are primarily "traditional" (European) immigrant source countries, (with the exception of Philippines, Japan and Mexico). It may prove fruitful to extend upon her research with the inclusion of other ethnic groups that have recently become more prominent in Canada and United States.

Another loophole is that Antecol has not stratified her immigrants by cohorts, or taken a possible cohort effect into consideration. She works around the measurement bias by looking at immigrants who landed in the States after 1975 and uses 1989 gender-wage gap estimates from home countries. She argues that since the wage gaps have been relatively stable, for the countries she has *historical data on* (i.e. not all the 21 countries), from mid 70's onwards, the method she adopts should enable the model to overcome the measurement error.

Discussion

In this section I explore a few possible avenues for expansion of the literature especially with regards to differential labor market performance of immigrant women. With regards to the family investment hypothesis and the bargaining model, since both models have strength in argument the ideal model would incorporate both these theories. On a conceptual level, with respect to the properties of the utility functions, the bargaining model may not necessarily portray what it intends to. The indirect utility function is given as a function of wages, nonlabor income, and EEPs that an individual would have in the absence of the marriage agreement. But in terms of empirical work, these values are only observed after the maximizing labor market decisions of the individual are made (this, in the case of couples, only reveals w , y and α given that they are in a marriage). Thus, though in terms of general utility equations, both V^w and U_0^w , for instance, are functions of the same w_w , y_w and α_w , these variables must be observed separately for V^w and U_0^w . If this argument is valid, then the hours equation as specified by Biswal may not be correct. Assuming that if this is a flaw that can be corrected (or conversely, if it does not need correction), then the next step would involve an effort at delineating the characteristics that could differentiate the women whose labor market behavior follows the bargaining model from those that are better described by the family hypothesis

model. (One such trait, touched upon by Biswal, is the presence of young children). As for extending the analysis of the impact of cultural factors, it is not far-fetched to state the following: As cultural factors influence participation decisions, therefore, it is of interest to formulate a model for the "portable participation" of women, as opposed to portable wage gap, which may have been telling only half the story. Other means of explaining divergence in labor market experiences of immigrant women have included "unionization" and its interplay with ethnicity, and the size of the census metropolitan areas. However, I have not elaborated on these avenues in this paper for two simple reasons. With regards to 'union' participation, the articles I gathered reflected that *immigrant men* were the disadvantaged group in that they were only "two-thirds as likely to be union members as majority group males" [11], while the numbers for female immigrants did not appear quite so dismal. The paper, by Reitz and Verma, suggests that the low rate of unionization among immigrant men has implications on their wage profile, and thus contributes to the slow wage assimilation that is revealed using the Survey of Labor and Income Dynamics data from 1994. However, the rate of unionization in itself does not necessarily reflect labor market advantage or disadvantage; therefore this model could perhaps increase its explanatory power by stratifying the regression by occupation, and industry; doing so with an understanding of the types of jobs typically unionized and the returns to unionization given a certain occupation/industry may provide a working explanation for the results obtained by Reitz and Verma. Since all the factors considered in this paper have been proven, in the respective articles, to have significant impact on the labor market performance of immigrant women, one could then postulate that in order to achieve a holistic picture, these factors need to be observed using the same data set. This would enable one to evaluate the relative importance of each of these factors in the explanation of the labor activities of immigrant women, and therefore refine our understanding of the performance of the immigrant pool [11].

Conclusion

This paper has focused on a presentation and analysis of the models and theories surrounding labor market behavior of immigrants and of immigrant women, as opposed to scrutinizing the results obtained by the researchers. This approach is espoused because of the variation in time horizons and data sources, utilized in the referenced articles, which would have lent a certain degree of variability in the results and

conclusions drawn by individual researchers. Also, certain assumptions and conclusions made by these researchers may not be valid due to the continuously changing dimensions and characteristics of the immigrant labor force, coupled with changing immigration policies. For instance, most of these articles either presume or reflect that in (either) both the United States and Canada 'family class' immigrants were growing as a percent of total immigrants. However, government of Canada published that in the year 2000, approximately 60% of the immigrants belonged to the 'economic' category, which indicates that the proportion of this category has

been growing relative to the others. Furthermore, the government's improved awareness of immigrant performance and barriers faced by immigrants (through articles such as the ones referenced in this paper) would have contributed towards government measures. These measures may have influenced/changed the performance of the *pool* of new immigrant cohorts, directly, through immigration policies, selection criteria, etc., and, indirectly, through the provision of supplementary programs etc. to ease integration, or through other forms of regulatory labor market interventions.

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Remarks

ⁱ Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), U.S. philosopher, author, naturalist. "Chesuncook" (1858) in The Maine Woods (1864), in The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, vol. 3, pp. 138, Houghton Mifflin (1906).

ⁱⁱ Note: The convergence occurs if an observed "integration effect" takes place, i.e. immigrant returns to years in the host country are above and beyond those enjoyed by native-born individuals, thereby enabling the immigrants to catch-up with the native-born workforce.

ⁱⁱⁱ This is of relevance because immigrants who are admitted in the family and refugee classes do not have to meet the skill .requirement and may thus possess fewer host-country specific skills.

^{iv} This reveals that regardless of the landing year, immigrants from Asia and Other Europe (i.e. besides UK) have the lowest average employments earnings amongst immigrants.

^v They also estimate wage equations in a similar manner.

^{vi} Z_{it}^j has two components: control variables including age and education of both husband and wife, number of unmarried children. living at home, region, urban residence, mother tongue, and presence of children under seven years of age. The immigrant assimilation component captures the cohort effects, the effect of years since migration, and time effect.

^{vii} Implying that immigrant women, whose husbands belong to the same cohort, work more hours than their native counterparts

^{viii} Implying erosion of hours' differences between immigrant and native-born women over time.

^{ix} The log of the current marginal utility of wealth is a function of the path of wages, prices, and the nonlabor income of the family.

^x Likewise, the labor supply of the male partner is a function of the same variables.

^{xi} But not by mixed families in most cases.